Huda Ammori v Secretary of State
for the Home Department
Judicial Review - The Proceedings /contd. 4.
Graphic: Discovery Analytical Resourcing
Natural Justice
Ground 8 argues that common law principles protecting the right of representation of an accused supplements statutory procedures, including affirmative resolution, unless expressly excluded therefrom. The contentious nature of the decision to proscribe PA, the Order's intention to destroy PA as an organisation and its impact on rights claimed under Ground 2 give rise to an obligation on the SSHD to consult. The procedural ground of challenge is well-established, viz. (Bank Mellat v HM Treasury 2 [2013] UKSC39 ¶178-9):
"the rule is that, before a statutory power is exercised, any person who foreseeably would be significantly detrimentally affected by the exercise should be given the opportunity to make representations in advance, unless (i) the statutory provisions concerned expressly or impliedly provide otherwise or (ii) the circumstances in which the power is to be exercised would render it impossible, impractical or pointless to afford such an opportunity. "
The alleged national security context will not obstruct the rule, nor would the disputed designation of terrorism obviate its validity.
Defence objections honed in on the risk in principle of rending the Order pointless if forewarning were given through referral to PA, allowing concealment, for example, of the organisation's operational assets. That contention, self-evidently, carries little traction, since PA bears no resemblance to a caricature terrorist outfit clandestinely engaged in international armed struggle. Relying on case law from Begum v. SSHD (No 2) [2024] {1 WLR 4269 103-112}, where frustration of statute was ruled to be a matter of general principle rather than requiring demonstration, Eadie asserted that a duty to consult would be inconsistent with protection of public safety and the urgency to act, given 'significant public concern' about PA activities. A key objective of Part 2 of the Terrorism Act (2000) is to disrupt the viability of a listed organisation, which end would be compromised by any such duty.
Hussain criticised the reliance on Begum 2 by pointing out that it was a contextually misplaced transference of dicta from a ruling heard under proceedings of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, which legislation does contain express restrictions of common law rights and governs special procedures regarding immigration cases. That prior notification of proscription would compromise the Order's effect was without evidential basis: no urgency had been recorded over months in various minuted reports on PA. The Terrorism Act (2000), s123(5), contains provision for the issuance of a temporary order necessary by reason of urgency, but none was sought.
PA had in effect been given around a fortnight's notice of the decision to proscribe, and yet no opportunity to consult on it was apparent, in spite of acknowledgement in a ministerial submission (26 March 2025) that there had been no precedent for proscription of direct action protest movements. If such opportunity had been pursued, Claimant & intervener submissions now presented to Court would have provided substantial material that should have impacted the SSHD's exercise of discretion, correcting significant factual inaccuracies and mischaracterisations of PA’s objectives, activities, organisational structure and funding model.
▮ On the final afternoon of proceedings, the Court went into CLOSED session for a short period in order that material alleged sensitive to the conduct of national security could be aired before the judges. A similar disclosure exemption had been applied for but declined (in the form presented) at the permissions appeal heard in September 2025.
▮ Both Amnesty International UK and Liberty were permitted Interveners in the case. Their submission to the judicial review may be consulted here.
What Happened Next: Addendum, 26 February 2026
In a closely-argued judgment handed down 13 February 2026 {[2026] EWHC 292 (Admin)}, the court in brief summary found the following:
- Ground 8: no general obligation arose for the Home Secretary to offer prior notice of her issuance of the Order to proscribe;
- Ground 5: disallowed as discrete matters of claim in that these are subsumed by contentions filed under Grounds 2 and 6;
- Ground 6: the Home Secretary's decision - relying broadly on operational consequences and advantages of proscription - was made inconsistently with her policy and thence in breach of section 6 of the Human Rights Act;
- Ground 2: proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation consists in disproportionate interferences with ECHR Articles 10 and 11.
The requirements for relief claimed by the Secretary of State under s31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (in the event, pertinent to Ground 6) were not adequately contingent.
An ensuing Order of 25 February 2026 quashed the proscription Order, stayed pending resolution of the SSHD's application to appeal, which was allowed. The Claimant's application for permission to cross-appeal was refused. Excepting those occasioned by the petition for interim relief, the Defendant was to pay the Claimant's costs arising from proceedings heard before the Administrative and Divisional Courts.