Discovery Analytical Resourcing |
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Huda Ammori v Secretary of State
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Diametric Misrepresentation Opening for Ammori, Raja Husain KC emphasised the unique novelty of proscription targeting a direct action protest group, it being common ground between the parties that less than one percent of PA's property damage had triggered such classification according to provisions of TA2K. There existed a long tradition in Britain, to which PA belonged, of protest against injustice that targeted military and commercial assets. In her submission, Ammori had contrasted the aim of terrorism - to take lives and commit atrocities - as the exact opposite of that of PA aiming to frustrate arms supplies to perpetrators of atrocities. Both TA2K and PA's proscription had invoked international reproval from respected experts in the field, whilst the banning had incited a mass campaign of civil disobedience through out the country. Sir Geoffrey Vos MR questioned whether PA's agency was compatible with Leggatt LJ's portrayal of an organisation committed to direct action: "public, non-violent, conscientious act[s] contrary to law, done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government" Counsel responded that historically the law had tolerated a range of symbolic and demonstrative transgressions committed peacefully in the interests of the public good, albeit some criminal by evidential characterisation, within which scope PA would place itself. Extraordinary attributes of TA2K were highlighted: both the definition of terrorism and the test for proscription are very wide; the impact of proscription spreads broadly and lands severely. Certain sections covering support for a proscribed organisation carry a low threshold for prosecution and a weighty penalty on conviction, strict liability requiring no proportionate assessment of frequency of offending. It was argued that Parliament's intention was to ensure the legislative compatibility of such heavy power with the Human Rights Act 1998, section 6, and its implementation compliant with the common law. It was thus critical that an executive act of ministerial discretion not be subsumed by a determinant literal application of legislative syntax.
Particular Need Exercise of the SSHD's discretion must evaluate the proportionality of proscribing - whether the restrictions imposable are commensurate with the benefits to be obtained by issuance of an order. By her policy, the SSHD should question via the five factors if a particular need arises in respect of exercise of the proscription powers. The District Court was right to find that the SSHD required 'a particular need to proscribe' PA beyond the assessment of a 'concern-in-terrorism' under TA2K. That much by definition consisted in the two-stage property of the widely-casting statutory process. It also found, correctly by the Respondent's argument, that the resultant utility of proscription was not a relevant consideration in gauging that need. Those cited advantages relied centrally on the application of ss11-13 of TA2K that imposed on an alternative population to that allegedly 'concerned-in-terrorism', thereby not possessing relevance to operative factors of the policy, exceeding ECHR proportionality and attempting to admit a rational circularity to the analysis. Husain acknowledged the Appellant's reference to the Court's interpretation as 'legalistic', through citation of Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee CC [2012] PTSR 983 (SC) §§18-19, while extending the quotation with its counter-inference: "planning authorities do not live in the world of Humpty Dumpty: they cannot make the [policy] mean whatever they would like it to mean." The SSHD's appeal that proscription of PA should have been found 'unusually effective' in its consequences by the District Court lacked any persuasive factual basis. It would also require the Court to exceed its calling by 'stepping into the shoes of the primary decision-maker'.
Article 17 redux Owen Greenhall for the Respondent countered the appellate invocation of ECHR Article 17 (activity subverting Convention rights). Logical circularity apart, its incidence under judgment has to be exceptional and extreme, while expression must aim at destruction of Convention rights. The very broad definition of terrorism under TA2K will not render a domestic 'connection-in-terrorism' determinative under Convention law. ECtHR case law features no such authority that would convey loss of Convention protections (citing Roj TV A/S v. Denmark [2018] 67 EHRR SE8 §31; R v ABJ [2026] UKSC 8 [AB/49/1793]). Protections are not removed by the charge of criminality involving serious damage to property alone (e.g. spray painting; substantial financial loss); nor for statements supporting such organisations. Greenhall returned to the point emphasised during judicial review that the SSHD had failed thoroughly to consider appropriate alternative measures to proscription that would not unacceptably interfere with Convention rights. Without considering the Appellant assertion here that serious property damage engaged national security considerations, there were adequate criminal prosecutions open to the SSHD to restrict PA's activities that did not involve proscription: property damage; aggravated trespass; public nuisance; breaches of public order; along with other police disruption powers under TA2K, behaviour orders and asset forfeiture. A civil injunction had been obtained to curtail PA's activity at military equipment manufacturer Teledyne in December 2024. |
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