Huda Ammori v Secretary of State
for the Home Department
Judicial Review - The Appeal /contd. 3
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Fair balance in the public interest
Hussein resumed with the importance of assuring fair balance in evaluation of the impact of suspended Convention protections. The expansive scope of TA2K should entail careful assessment of proportionality, its scope reaching beyond organisational membership to encompass performative or multi-media expressions of (careless) support, assistance, or financial aid for prohibited entities. The Divisional Court correctly found a "very significant interference with Convention rights" [§§135,140] in respect of the range of people impacted by PA's proscription - the Respondent; members; individuals opposing the Order; civil liberties campaigning groups; journalism; academia; culture and the arts - while acknowledging the chilling effect of misapplication of TA2K provisions.
Concerning PA's proscription, the SSHD's exercise of discretion under TA2K relied solely on the unprecedented basis of participating in, encouraging, or preparing for serious property damage. Husain referred to the Appellant's mention of there being no bright line demarcating the definition of where such damage becomes terroristic - 'a mine of grammatic inference' - from which no conclusions should be hoisted. Intelligence sources had briefed the minister that PA was not an organisation advocating violence nor reckless damage to property and very rarely involved in offences against the person. The three incidents that the Appellants relied upon comprised outliers in advice from a raft of intelligence specialists characterising PA as a non-violent organisation; whereas, concerning PA actions elsewhere (e.g. Scotland), reports assessed these had "not come close" to the statutory definition of terrorism. Indeed, the picture presented over the months preceding proscription was that of a reduction, as opposed to escalation, in PA activity.
Carr LCJ questioned whether serious property damage might also provide a threat to national security - the action at RAF Brize Norton, for example. The SSHD had, it was recalled from the preceding review, decided that the Brize Norton break-in was not a terrorist event, it aligning with historical incidents that targeted military bases incurring little damage. In March 2025, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and separately the Proscription Review Group, found no significant concerns in this regard following respective assessments. At this time also, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence jointly had evaluated PA's risk to the defence industry as low - the Appellant had submitted no discrete evidence establishing a material effect on the UK's national security nor defence industries.
The claim that the SSHD had been deprived of a proper degree of margin by the Divisional Court lacked merit - relevant legal authorities had been referenced during proceedings and no misdirection identified. Over matters of proportionality assessment engaging section 6 of the Human Rights Act, it should be the courts, rather than the political executive, that possess expertise in appreciation. The Appellant's claim for a fresh proportionality exercise (relying on Shvidler [2025] UKSC30 §162 exceptionalism) was inappropriate since here there were no divergent tensions with primary legislation nor search in play for precedential clarity.
Cross-Appeal
Addressing matters under cross-appeal concerning the SSHD's failure to consult the Respondent on issuance of the proscription Order, Husain argued that the Court should follow established common law right concerning the exercise of statutory power unless overtaken by necessary implication. The prevailing authority was cited as Bank Mellat (Bank Mellat v HM Treasury 2 [2013] UKSC39 §§29,31,179,191), the duty otherwise avoidable only where "circumstances in which the power is to be exercised would render it impossible, impractical or pointless to afford such an opportunity". That could not be the case where: national security concerns did not apply; there was no temporal urgency to proscribe; no prospect of pre-emptive avoidance frustrating the Order's effect; and an obvious point of contact.
On direct discrimination of PA, counsel rejected the District Court's finding that the Ground was insubstantially presented. Comparability with other single-issue, direct action groups - in the context of proscription analysis - had been a feature of documented pleadings relaying ministerial considerations of PA and yet showing no procedural exercise conducted justifying PA's differential treatment under proscription legislation. Although requested opportunity to supply procedural evidence had been allowed by Chamberlain J presiding over the preceding hearing, none was ever supplied by the SSHD, nor even in respect of alleged distinguishing particularities adversely attaching to PA. Ben Watson KC, replying for the SSHD, relied on the impracticality of establishing comparative cohorts where the SSHD's discretion power facilitated fact-sensitive assessment of context - the burden on the SSHD would be impossible to discharge. PA, it was claimed, had 'crossed a line' by adopting escalatory conduct.
▮ The Court entered CLOSED session for a short period on the morning of 30 April 2026 in order that material alleged sensitive to the conduct of national security could be aired in camera.
▮ On 30 April 2026, the court issued a reporting-restriction order covering Palestine Action proceedings. The order prohibited media outlets publishing any arguments, evidence, or the identities of those alleged to have supported Palestine Action. It's duration was set to remain in place until either the court's final judgment was delivered or, if that hadn't yet occurred, on 31 May 2026. Restrictions were lifted on 5 May 2026.
What Happened Next: Addendum, 30 June 2026
Exposed Decision
The judgment, reserved for handing down on 15 June 2026, treated the OPEN proceedings only - the CLOSED proceedings heard in camera will not be subject to public disclosure.
Their Justices' acknowledged that the appeal imposes interstitial interpretation of the relationship between 'respective constitutional responsibilities and institutional competencies of the courts and the executive' - a case of "major social [and] political significance" - while also highlighting, as a matter of public interest, the government's use of proscription powers conveyed to it by the Terrorism Act 2000.
Unusually, but helpfully (for its conceptual navigation), the Decision is indexed by sections to include what might be described as an executive summary outlining the conclusions forming the Justices' finding. It is recommended that those curious to follow the Decision's interpretative trajectory best consult the judgment's referential structure. In brief:
- the Divisional Court was found to have misinterpreted the Home Secretary's proscription policy by constraining its evaluative scope;
- the Divisional Court erred in respect of evaluating the proportionality of the proscription Order regarding the margin of appreciation allowed and relevant risk considered;
- it was found appropriate to conduct a revised proportionality-assessment exercise;
- the Respondent's cross-appeal was disallowed;
- Palestine Action was not found to be a direct action group engaged in civil disobedience, but one overtly promoting unlawful violence amounting to terrorism;
- the balance of rights of freedoms of speech and assembly with those of third-parties and the interests of national security has been obtained by imputation of the institutional competence and democratic accountability accorded to the Home Secretary.
The Respondent's application to appeal, submission of which was required within seven days of the hearing, was declined on 22 June.